

Message Text

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PAGE 01 CAIRO 08640 231737Z
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USMISSION GENEVA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 8640

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, EG
SUBJ: DISARMAMENT - EGYPTIAN VIEWS

1. POST TOOK ADVANTAGE OF USIS-SPONSORED VISIT TO EGYPT OF
DR ROBERT GALLUCCI (ACDA OFFICIAL ON LEAVE OF ABSENCE FOR
ONE YEAR AT INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES IN LONDON) TO
HAVE GENERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH KEY MFA OFFICIALS DEALING WITH
DISARMAMENT. ON MAY 23 POLCOUNRS AND GALLUCCI CALLED INDIV-
IDUALLY ON DIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPT AMRE MOUSSA AND
DIR LEGAL DEPT AMB NABIL AL-ARABY.

2. SALT TALKS. MOUSSA SAID US UNDERSTANDABLY GIVES MORE IMPORT-
ANCE TO BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH USSR THAN TO MULTILATERAL
DISARMAMENT FOR WHICH TOO FREQUENTLY LEAD ONLY TO MORE RES-
OLUTIONS. GOE WOULD LIKE TO SEE SALT AGREEMENTS, AND TECHNICAL
AND OTHER ASPECTS ARE OF COURSE BETWEEN US AND USSR. ON POS-
ITIVE SIDE, MOUSSA SAID, IT WOULD CONSOLIDATE DETENTE AND
HOPEFULLY ENABLE SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC RESOURCES TO
BE DIVERTED TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. THERE COULD ALSO BE NEG-
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 CAIRO 08640 231737Z

ATIVE CONSEQUENCES. FOR EXAMPLE, IF COMPREHENSIVE SALT II
AGREEMENT IS REACHED, AND IF SALT PROCESS CONTINUES, IT WOULD
EVENTUALLY AND NATURALLY LEAD TO DIVISION OF THE WORLD INTO
SPHERES OF RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN INFLUENCE. THIS, GOE WOULD WATCH
CAREFULLY AND WARILY, BUT IT DID NOT MEAN GOE WOULD OPPOSE
SALT AGREEMENTS. ASKED IF FAILURE OF SALT TALKS COULD HAVE
IMPACT ON MD, MOUSSA SAID HE DID NOT SEE A DIRECT RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN SALT AND ME. THUS, WHILE SALT TALKS COOULD GO ON WHILE CONFLICTS IN ANGOLA, HORN OF ARIACA AND ELSEWHERE CONTINUE, IN THE LONG RUN SALT CANNOT BE INSULATED FROM OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. MOUSSA ALSO SAID THAT, IN HIS MIND, THERE WAS NOT MUCH LINKAGE BETWEEN SALT TALKS AND PROLIFERATION AMONG THIRD COUNTRIES. HE SPECIFICALLY DISCOUNTED THE IMPORTANCE OFNUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES NPT UNDERTAKING TO PROCEED WITH DISARMAMENT. AT THE SAME TIME HE THOUGHT IT APPROPRIATE AND USEFUL FOR US AND USSR TO REPORT TO NNWS ONPROGRESSIN SALT.

3. GALLUCCI SAID US IS MORE INTERESTED IN LARGER DISARMAMENT FORA TODAY THAN EVER BEFORE IN PART BECAUSE OF TIS VERY REAL CONCERN OF PROLIFERATION. HE SAID THAT, WHILE SALT TALKS MAY NOT DIRECTLY AFFECT PROLIFERATION, A SALT AGREEMENT THAT INVOLVED REDUCTIONS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY CONTRIBUTUE TO POLITICAL CLIMATE SUPPORTING NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SALT TALKS WILL BE LONG AND DIFFICULT TO WORK OUT AND THAT IF PROGRESS IS SLOW IT WILL BE HELPFUL IF NNWS, LIKE EGYPT, WILL BE PATIENT AND SUPPORT NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS INDEPENDENT OF THE PACE IN SALT.

4. UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD). ACCORDING TO MOUSSA, GOE OBJECTIVES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A). DECLARATIONS ARE NOT ENOUGH; CONCRETE RESULTS SHOULD COME OUT OF CONFERENCE. FOR EXAMPLE, PROGRAM THAT WOULD INSPECT VARIOUS ORGANS OF UN WORKING ON DISARMAMENT MATTERS AND MERGE THEIR ACTIVITIES TO AVOID DUPLICATION OF EFFORT. CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 CAIRO 08640 231737Z

IN SHORT THERE WAS NEED FOR RATIONALIZATION OF TOTAL UN DISARMAMENT MACHINERY.

B) AN ACTION PROGRAM SHOULD NOT START ON BASIS OF CURRENT STATUS QUO. ISRAEL OCCUPIES EGYPTIAN TERRITORIES AND THIS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

C) GOE IS INTERESTED IN HOW INSTRUMENTS OF DISARMAMENT WHICH HAVE BEEN CREATED, SUCH AS NPT, CAN BE FOLLOWED UP. FOR EXAMPLE, WHAT WILL BE ROLE OF IAEA? HOW WILL NPT BE SUPERVISED? TRAFFIC IN ENRICHED URANIUM WHICH REACHING POINT THAT MANY COUNTRIES HAVE CAPABILITY TO HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

5. ME ARMS BALANCE. MOUSSA SAID NEED FOR ARMS BALANCE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT WAS NECESSARY FOR DURABLE ME PEACE AGREEMENT, BUT HOW TO ARRIVE AT BALANCE DEPENDED ENTIRELY ON THE US. AS LONG AS USPROVIDES ISRAEL WITH HIGHLY SOPHISCATED WEAPONS AND PERMITS COPRODUCTION OF ARMS ISRAEL WILL REMAIN MILITARY SUPERIOR AND HAVE NO INCENTIVE TO REACH AN

AGREEMENT. WITH REGARD TO POSSIBILITY OF MBFR TYPE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAELIS UNDER WHICH RECIPIENTS COULD THEMSELVES AGREE TO LIMIT ARMS IMPORTS, MOUSSA SAID THAT ONE PROBLEM WOULD BE THAT EGYPT HAS OTHER SECURITY COMMITMENTS SUCH AS IN AFRICA. GALLUCCI REMARKED THAT THERE WERE COMPARABLE COMPLICATING FACTORS IN MBFR AND SALT TALKS AND, IN THE LATTER CASE, THE SOVIETS HAVE ARGUED THAT THEIR SECURITY NEEDS EXTEND BEYOND THE US-SOVIET BALANCE AND INCLUDE THE THREAT FROM CHINA.

6. PNE AND REACTORS. AL-ARABY SAID TI WAS NECESSARY FOR ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO HAVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY FOR THEIR OWN PROGRESS NOT AS MATTER OF PRESTIGE. QUESTION WAS HOW COULD THIS BE DONE? ON PNE'S GALLUCCI SAID, US HAD MADE DECISION THAT PNE'S DO NOT PAY ECONOMICALLY OR POLITICALLY. US HAS ALSO TRIED TO PERSUADE USSR OF VIRTURE OF FOREGOING POSSIBLE MARGINAL BENEFIT OF PNE'S IN INTEREST OF ESTABLISHING NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 04 CAIRO 08640 231737Z

OTHER METHODS OF ACCOMPLISHING OBJECTIVES OF PNE PROJECTS SHOULD ALWAYS BE SOUGHT BY BOTH NWS AND NNWS.

7. NPT REVIEW. AL-ARABY THOUGHT NPT REVIEW CONF IN 1980 LIKELY TO BE DISASTER SINCE INTER ALIA US NOT PROVIDING WHAT IS HAD PROMISED. GOE IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT SECURITY OF NON-NUCLEAR STATES. WHAT GOE WANTS IS GUARANTEE THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE ON-SITE INSPECTION OF DIMONA. AS FIRST STEP, ISREAL SHOULD ADHERE TO NPT. UNSC RES 255 (1968) WAS TOTALLY INADQUATE IN MEETING SECURITY CONCERNS OF NON-NUCLEAR STATES. AL-ARABY ALSO MENTIONED AS POSSIBLE SECOND STEP, A UN RESOLUTION OFFERING GENUINE ASSURANCES OF NNWS. HE OBSERVED SUCH ASSURANCES COULD BE REGIONAL, DESIGNED FOR THE ME, AND NEED NOT NECESSARILY SPEAK TO THE GENERAL ISSUE NNWS SECURITY. HE MENTIONED THAT URANIUM THAT REPORTEDLY DISAPPEARED WHILE BEING SHIPPED IN 1968, IS OF GREAT CONCERN TO EGYPT SINCE IT PRESUMABLY WENT TO ISRAEL.

8. COMMENT: GOE CONTINUES TO MAKE MUCH OF NEED FOR SOME TYPE ARMS BALANCE WITHISRAEL, IN ORDER THAT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT SUCCEDD AND, IF THEY DO, PRODUCE DURABLE PEACE. THERE IS, HOWEVER, LITTLE EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT GOE HAS EVEN BEGUN TO STUDY SUBJECT OF ARMS EQUIALENCY, LIMITATION ON ARMS TRANSFERS, ETC. INSTEAD STOCK ANSWER IS THAT, SINCE US IS MAJOR SUPPLIER OF ARMS TO ISRAEL, IT IS UP TO US TO ARRANGE FOR AND GUARANTEE PARITY OF MILITARY POWER AS PRT OF ME SETTLEMENT.

9. GALLUCCI VISIT HAS PROVEN MOST USEFUL IN EXPANDING OUR VERY LIMITED DISCUSSIONS WITH GOE ON DISARMAMENT MATTERS. WE BELIEVE THAT VISITS TO KEY POSTS BY DISARMAMENT SPECIALISTS

WOULD BE USEFUL PRIOR TO SSOD.
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Message Attributes

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